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Abstract 
The European Commission is seeking ways to promote both the harmonization of 
transport policies among its constituent members and the homogenization of transport 
market conditions. The main goal is to insure that each transport mode pays for the true 
social and economic costs produced by it: transport taxes and prices should vary 
according to infrastructure damage, degree of congestion, risk of accidents and the 
expenses they cause, and environmental nuisances and damage. However, it is difficult 
to modify the present national systems in favor of a European-wide one, because every 
country has different perceptions of the need and reasons to implement such a 
European-wide system. Spain, like other EU countries, is considering the European 
transport policy and the related regulations which are intended to homogenize the 
present fragmented road pricing schemes. In Spain, different groups of road 
stakeholders (road freight and passengers’ operators, highway concessionaires, and 
associations of private car users) have experience with toll roads dating back to the 
1960s. But a recent study of transport pricing, the Spanish Road Pricing Model 
(META), had as one of its aims the capture of different degrees of acceptance of a 
generalized road pricing system, and demonstrated that these stakeholders are still not 
willing to fully pay for the external costs (environmental and road safety costs) of the 
road network. The low approval rates raises questions about the most effective way for 
Spanish governmental bodies, those that are administratively responsible, to introduce a 
generalized tolling scheme.  
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INTRODUCTION: PRICING AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN THE EU  
 
The European Commission has advocated the reform of transport pricing, so as to 
harmonize transport policies and make more efficient the transport system by making 
the market conditions more similar in the member countries. Since 1970, the EU has 
been trying to establish a pricing policy that is fair and acceptable for all countries (1). 
The European Commission’s Green Paper “Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in 5 
Transport” (2) launched a discussion on pricing transport according to the marginal cost 
and the recovery of fixed investment costs. The White Paper “Fair Payment for 
Infrastructure Use” (3) took this approach a step further, and presented a gradual path 
for implementing all transport modes, which was then adopted in the White Paper 
“European Transport Policy 2010: Time to decide” (4). The main goal was to ensure 10 
that each transport mode pays for the costs its operation produces. Transport taxes and 
prices should vary according to infrastructure damage, degree of congestion, risk of 
accident, and environmental nuisances.  
 
In parallel, more regulation of transport pricing has been developed by EU 15 
directives. The 1999/62 EU directive (5) allows member countries to introduce a 
distance related charge for using European highways to cover construction, 
maintenance, and exploitation costs.  This earlier directive was modified in 2006 by 
Directive 2006/38/EC (6) on the charging of HGVs for the use of certain kinds of 
infrastructure. This more recent Directive paved the way for the introduction of charges 20 
on vehicles and especially HGVs in the EU countries, based on the distances they travel 
and the estimated resultant pollution. A new objective of this charge is to cover the 
costs of both pollution and congestion. But the necessary legal criteria to define how, 
and when, to collect the pollution charge have still not been formulated. As a 
consequence, the EU countries possess neither the necessary incentives, nor explicit 25 
conditions made clear, for implementing such a charge. Only the new directive project 
of 2008/0147 (7) tries to define reliable methods for estimating pollution and congestion 
costs and to calculate the appropriate road charge for each kind of vehicle. In any case, 
the EU directives are guidelines which have to be implemented by each country in the 
way they prefer, following the “subsidiarity principle” (8). 30 
 
Some countries have already adopted a charge for highway use. For instance, 
according to a 1999/62 EU directive, Austria and Germany moved a few years ago to a 
distance-based charging approach for HGVs over 12 tons (9). Recently, the Czech 
Republic also adopted an approach similar to that of Austria and Germany 10). 35 
Switzerland, even though it is not a member of the EU, has been charging HGVs above 
3.5 tons for use of Swiss roads on all their roads since 2001 (11). 
 
The introduction of road pricing, experience shows, is a highly controversial 
topic, and the European Commission has offered a path to gradual implementation of 40 
charges introduced to encourage efficiency and at the same time to charge for ecological 
damage caused by road transport. In this regard, some European studies have dealt with 
the acceptability of road pricing schemes for passenger and freight transport (8) (9) (12) 
(13) (14) as well as with systematic studies of the prevailing trends in public opinion 
concerning tolling and pricing, based on polls taken before, and then after, the 45 
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implementation of such measures, and this polling includes various American states 
California, Texas and Minnesota (15). 
 
Spain has 13,156 Km of interurban highways network (16), of which only 2,814 
km of those highways are tolled sections. Like other EU countries, Spain is obliged to 50 
consider the European Union’s transport policy and regulations designed to define, and 
promote, a fair and homogeneous generalized road pricing scheme. An initial study of 
interurban transport pricing has been carried out at the national level, where the major 
debate is about the relative efficiency of different road pricing instruments and what the 
appropriate price levels should be in different interurban road contexts (17). A survey of 55 
public opinion in various countries revealed differing attitudes toward country-specific 
pricing measures in nine European Countries (18), but no survey has covered the 
acceptance rate for the pre-implementation road pricing schemes in a southern European 
country such as Spain. 
 60 
In the context of the research project META, aimed at defining a Spanish Road 
Pricing Model (17), an Internet-based survey was conducted between November 2008 
and March 2009. The target population consisted of the various groups of road 
stakeholders: operators of Spanish roads for both freight and passengers; highway 
concessionaires; associations of users of private cars; and even some of those who make 65 
transport policy. The aim was to capture different dimensions of acceptability vis-à-vis 
the potential implementation of a generalized road pricing system in Spain. 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the data collected by the Internet-based 
survey on public acceptability of a road pricing system, in the pre-implementation 70 
period, based on both external and infrastructural costs. Despite the general agreement 
that environmental problems due to road passengers and freight transport are serious 
threats to people’s welfare, proposed solutions such as the implementation of a road 
pricing system based on the external cost requiring changes in behavior (use of vehicles, 
for example) are not easily accepted. 75 
 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section—after the 
introduction—provides an overview of the current state of research on acceptability 
which is necessary for understanding the possible determinants of stakeholders’ 
behavior; to identify the barriers to public acceptance and the potential supporters and 80 
opponents of pricing and tolling proposals. The second section presents the 
characteristics of the actual Spanish road pricing scheme now in use. The third section 
describes the scope and the methodology used for the survey. The fourth section 
presents a descriptive and statistical analysis of the results. The fifth section draws 
conclusions about implications for road pricing policy as a result of the acceptability 85 
survey. 
 
 
STATE OF RESEARCH ON ACCEPTABILITY  
 90 
Three kinds of research can be undertaken to analyze transport policy measures 
in general and road pricing policies in particular. First, predictions about acceptability 
derived from theoretical models that rest on assumptions about individual behavior can 
be tested against the results of a user road survey (12). Second, analysis of the 
individual attitudes can be furthered means of an empirical survey approach 95 
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(questionnaire, interview, etc.) (9). Third, ex-post study allows for investigation of 
individual behavioral changes in response to a specific policy measure (19). This means 
that the first approach derives from the assumptions about the individual behavior in a 
theoretical model that has to be tested a posteriori, while the second one derives from 
the direct observations employed to construct the hypothesis of an empirical model. 100 
Several European studies confirm that the acceptance of road pricing by users is closely 
linked to the perception of freedom, fairness and efficiency in the pricing of road use 
(12) (20)(21) (22). 
In particular, the debate is focused mainly on the following subjects related to the 
perception by users of fairness (1-3) and of the toll system efficiency (4-6): 105 
 
1. Method used to calculate the road price; 
2. Vehicles affected by the road charge;  
3. Compensation measures to account for the fact that the road charge is imposed 
on the existing taxes (on fuel, costs of registration and licensing, etc.);  110 
4. Time-savings achieved and congestion problems avoided; 
5. Use of toll revenues and trust in government and other agencies involved as a like as 
toll revenues managers; 
6. Toll collection system. 
 115 
Therefore, the analysis of the degree of perceived fairness, and hence of 
acceptability, in toll-road pricing effects is a complex matter that can be approached in a 
number of ways (23) (24). Generally, it is complicated to arrive at a compromise in a 
road pricing scheme when there are desired and competing objectives in efficiency, 
fairness, and acceptability (25). The perception by some social groups, or transport 120 
sectors, that the road pricing measures are unfair has been one of the major obstacles to 
the implementation of a toll scheme (26). A majority of the effects linked to the fairness 
of a road pricing policy relate to the ultimate use of the revenues collected by the toll  
and to the existing level of trust in government and other agencies involved (8) (27). For 
the same reason, the management and use of the revenues is a key factor in guaranteeing 125 
acceptance of the road pricing policy that is adopted. (28). 
 
 
 
ROAD PRICING POLICY IN SPAIN. META:  A ROAD PRICING  MODEL 130 
PROPOSAL 
 
The present pricing system for Spanish highways is quite fragmented. Some highway 
construction is financed by tolls on users through concession contracts, other highway 
construction is financed by shadow tolls, that is tolls paid not by the immediate user, but 135 
paid to the concessionaire by the government as part of its general expenditures. The 
regions of Madrid and Murcia have been the first ones where the public administrations 
have applied shadow toll schemes as a way to remunerate the highway concessionaires.  
Previously, the Central Administration did not employ the device of the shadow toll, 
fearing a possible risk of increase in its general budget spending (29). But new laws on 140 
the concessionaire system introduce the possibility of using the shadow toll to finance 
road infrastructures (30). Related to this new regulatory perspective, more than 1,500 
km of new regional and national highways will be financed by a shadow toll scheme. 
Floridea Di Ciommo / Andrés Monzón / Alvaro Fernandez 6
The Central Government is using this shadow toll scheme at present to finance the 
concessions contracts for the maintenance, renovation, and operations of the national 145 
highway network. At present, the highways where the direct toll is used amount to 
2,814 km, while those that employ the shadow toll method of compensating 
concessionaires amount to 872 km. There is a plan to increase the highways relying on 
the shadow toll method to 2,275.15 km, possibly by the year 2010, according to the 
plans of the Department of  Spanish Infrastructures (31). The highways with a direct toll 150 
will then account for 60% of the total kilometers under concession and shadow toll 
schemes will be 40% (14). The direct toll range is between 0.06€/vkm and 0.16€/vkm 
and the shadow toll range between 0.05€/vkm and 0.09€/vkm (31). 
 
The analysis of the degree of acceptance is evaluated in the context of the 155 
Spanish road pricing model project (META), which proposes a vehicles tolling scheme 
aimed at recovering the cost for highway maintenance and operations as well as external 
costs. The META road pricing scheme proposed for the Spanish interurban road 
network is based on average costs calculated for each vehicle type (Car HGV, LGV and 
bus) following the interurban road characteristics (AADT, capacity and traffic 160 
composition for each section). As showed in Figure 1, for the Spanish interurban 
highways, mostly characterized as 4-lane - 2 plus 2- highways, congestion is not a 
current problem.  Therefore the marginal external cost is equal to the average external 
costs or even stays below the average external costs. In other words, the Spanish 
interurban roads, outside of the major metropolitan areas, are underused. That means 165 
that the road system is operating with increasing economies of scale (the system will be 
more efficient if more cars use the Spanish road network) To cover the external costs 
produced by a car user it is necessary to fix the toll so that it equals the average external 
costs. The case is slightly different when there is a comparison between marginal 
external and infrastructural cost and average external and infrastructural cost for the 170 
HGV, and where both costs are the same. This means that in the case of the HGV, the 
road system is operating with economies of scale that remain constant, the social 
optimal is financially viable, while the correct solution to determining tolls for private 
cars will be imperfect  because the condition of economic efficiency -- with a toll equal 
to the marginal external cost is not attainable In fact, the system is unable to finance 175 
itself: somebody has to pay to cover the difference between average external costs and 
marginal external costs. Two alternatives: the private car users pay a toll equal to the 
average external costs or the society as a whole decides to pay a part of the external 
costs. (32) (33). 
 180 
 
 
 
 
 185 
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FIGURE 1. Marginal and average external road transport costs comparison in a 4-
lane -2 plus 2- highway  
 
 190 
 
 
 
Following this empirical model for costs, the proposal for a toll scheme should 
include a price range for roads (2+2 - highways) of 0.09€ per car-km to 0.14€ per HGV-195 
km. Introducing road pricing measures is a highly controversial topic. Spanish freight 
operators have highlighted their opposition to the introduction of a generalized road 
pricing scheme unless there is a revision of the fuel national charge equal to 54% of fuel 
price (33). As a consequence, it will be useful here to offer an analysis of acceptability 
by stakeholders, before introducing the subject of a generalized road pricing scheme.  200 
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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH ON PRICING 
ACCEPTABILITY 
 205 
Data collection 
Data were collected through a self-administered Internet-based survey of transporters of 
both Spanish road freight and passengers, highway concessionaires and associations of 
private car users. They are the most representative road users groups. At the beginning 
of the META project, these stakeholder groups were encouraged to collaborate in 210 
managing the survey on road pricing acceptability and to communicate with the freight 
and passenger operators, highways concessionaires, and users of private vehicles. In 
Spain, for example, the freight transport sector is quite fragmented, even if 2/3 of the 
freight traffic, calculated by tonnage, is transported and managed directly or indirectly 
by the biggest transportation companies (34). As a consequence, we used the transport 215 
operators organizations to reach both the small and large operators in the business of 
freight transport.  The survey was conducted between October 2008 and March 2009. 
The aim was to capture different degrees of acceptability concerning the theoretical 
introduction of a generalized road pricing system in Spain.  
 220 
The starting point for developing the survey content were the acceptance factors 
identified by Shlag and Teubel (35) in their model of road pricing acceptability: 
 
- Perception of the transport problems (infrastructure damage, congestion, 
external and accidental costs) ; 225 
- Design charges (levels of charges and their variation depending on traffic  
congestions, type of vehicles, road type, and road quality) 
- Effect on public approval of the institutional framework 
- Use of revenues in combination with different options for the institutional 
framework (who collects the toll charge and who is entitled to decide on their 230 
use) 
- Perceived utility of road-user charges in solving transport-related problems.  
- Relationship between the social responsibility of users as to climate change, 
enhanced safety, and greater acceptability 
 235 
The sample was randomly selected by the operator associations from its 
databases, including companies of all sizes, with the biggest companies (more than 
5.000.000€ of financial turnover) having the largest representation. In particular, 70% of 
the sample population is characterized by an annual turnover higher than 5,000,000€, 
18% by an annual turnover between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000€ and only 5% by an 240 
annual turnover of less than 1,000,000€. 7% of those targeted for the survey are experts 
from the institutional and administrative fields. In particular, the freight transport 
operator associations sent the survey to 250 associated enterprises, yielding 48 answers. 
The organization of passenger transport operators sent the survey to 30 transport 
operators, which resulted in 15 answers. About the highways, the concessionaire 245 
organizations sent the survey to 25 technical directors of road maintenance and 
construction which resulted in 23 answers being returned. The association of private car 
users sent the survey to its 20 regional offices with an answer rate of 90% (17 technical 
directors answered).   
 250 
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At the very beginning of the questionnaire its main purpose was stated clearly: 
identify the key determinants (9) of what makes a particular level of road pricing 
acceptable. 
These determinants include:  
 255 
- expectations of users about the introduction of a road pricing system  extended 
to all Spanish interurban highways network  
- social responsibility concerning the environment and road safety  
- the evaluation of the efficiencies resulting from the  introduction of road pricing 
measures. 260 
 
Respondents were guaranteed that their responses were anonymous.  
 
They were also told how long (estimated at 7-10 minutes) filling out the 
questionnaire would take. No incentives were offered for responding. The questionnaire 265 
consisted of three modules: the first with questions regarding the company 
characteristics; the second took the form of an attitude questionnaire; the third offered 
various options which one could rank in terms of stated preferences.  
 
The survey of attitudes focused on the following sets of attitudinal questions: 270 
perception of road transport problems (six questions), institutional frameworks and the 
use of revenue (three questions), resulting beliefs and adaptation strategies of freight 
operators (three questions); design of charges and perceived usefulness of road-user 
charges to solve transport related problem (six questions); the effect on acceptability of 
the charging technology (two open-ended questions). The section on how to best design 275 
a regime of toll-charges contained questions regarding the types of vehicles that should 
be charged and the road network that has to be taxed (urban and interurban road 
network). This touches upon considerations of fairness (and whether to apply road 
pricing measures to all vehicles types and to all road networks). Responses to each 
question were collected using a four-point agreement scale (from “disagree” to 280 
“strongly agree”).  
 
In order to define the relationship between different price levels and revenue spending 
options, a simplified stated-preference exercise was included as part of the survey. In 
this exercise, respondents were asked to choose among different packages involving 285 
combinations of pricing and spending measures.  
 
In particular, three different toll levels were presented to the respondents, an 
average toll of 0.05€/km, an average toll of 0.10€km and a final one of 0€/km. The toll 
level of 0.05€/km corresponds to the minimum price value estimated by the META 290 
empirical model of costs, the amount necessary to cover the external costs for a car 
without road maintenance costs. The toll of 0.10€/km is calculated as summarizing 
external and maintenance costs for HGV for a 2 plus 2- lanes highway section of the  
road. In all cases, the toll charge doesn’t include the cost of road construction costs. All 
toll levels were linked with the following three revenue-spending options: 295 
 
- New road construction  
- Road safety 
- Climate change policy measures. 
 300 
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Each respondent had to choose between three different alternatives characterized 
by toll variations with an increasing investment in infrastructures, road safety and 
climate change policy measures. The Stated Preference (SP) experiment showed that the 
attitudes of individuals and their behavior reflected in the SP exercise are quite 
divergent. This divergence can be explained by the psychological theory affirming that 305 
the behaviors are influenced not only by the attitudes but even by other factors, 
including subjective norms  and deliberate behavior control so that  internalized social 
behavior, including being long accustomed not to pay for the road use, can influence 
behavior (36). 
 310 
 
 
 
SURVEY RESULTS 
 315 
The survey yielded responses from 114 road stakeholder groups, road transport 
companies and their collective organizations. A breakdown reveals that 42% of the 
sample population is constituted of freight transport operators, 13% are operators of 
passenger transport, 20% are technical people from highway concessionaires, 14% are 
mostly members of private car and road associations, 11% are experts from the 320 
institutional and administrative field. Among freight operators, 22% offered combined – 
road and rail – transport, while 34% offered logistical services.  In general, a sample 
size of 114 stakeholders could be considered quite small to make any conclusively 
determinations about public acceptance in Spain, but not about acceptance specifically 
by road stakeholders. The survey results on the attitude statements are quite similar for 325 
different kind of stakeholders. This result means that the heterogeneity of the sample is 
not  reflected in the heterogeneity of general attitudes as regards the road tolls. A 
breakdown of specific stakeholder groups will be presented only when their statement 
attitudes are significantly different. Concerning the SP experiment, a sample size of 114 
stakeholders can be considered an adjusted size, where the real total of the observations 330 
can be calculated as 114 multiplied by the number of choice tasks presented (37) (38).  
 
To correctly interpret the results we have to keep in mind that the distribution of 
company size, represented by the financial turnover, is characterized by a bias towards 
large companies (freight, passenger and road operators). This bias is due to the decision 335 
to use the stakeholder associations to send the Internet-based survey where the large 
transport and road companies are over-represented (70% of the sample operate with an 
annual turnover of over € 5 million). Another bias is intrinsic to the heterogeneity of the 
target population: different kinds of stakeholders are sent the same general 
questionnaire. This choice was prompted by the principal goal of the survey: to explore 340 
levels of the acceptance of different stakeholders groups regarding the implementation 
of a generalized road pricing scheme following the EU directives.  
The responses of many different kinds of stakeholders revealed their attitudes 
different dimensions of road pricing acceptability. The lower the value, the greater the 
disagreement, while the assigning of high values signifies agreement with the 345 
corresponding attitude statement. The following figures (2-6) show the mean and 
median agreement scores of the questions about attitude.  
 
 
 350 
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Transport problems perception   
 
The condition of the Spanish road network is good (59% of respondents agree or 
strongly agree and only 6% disagree). But 50% of the stakeholders believe that in the 355 
future the government will not have enough revenues to keep roads in such good 
condition. Some differences in the attitude statements emerge once one performs an 
analysis stakeholder by stakeholder. The majority of transport freight and passenger 
operators consider that congestion problems will increase their operation costs and 
decrease the quality of the services they can offer clients, while the highways 360 
concessionaires (more than 50%) do not completely agree with the statement that 
congestion problems will decrease the services that the transport operators  can offer 
clients. More than 50% of respondents think that road safety problems should be a 
priority for the government. When it comes to the need for measures to ameliorate 
climate change the percentage is lower: 46%.  In fact, more than 50% of the members of 365 
two stakeholder groups -- the passenger bus operators and the highway concessionaires 
-- answer that they neither agree nor disagree, while the other stakeholder groups, by a 
majority, agree with the statement  that the government should,  in its handling of the 
transport problem, give priority to limiting  environmental damage. 
 370 
 
The condition of Spanish highways network
0 1 2 3 4
6.Limitingt environmental  damage (cl imate change and an
increasing population affected by pollution and traffic noise),
should be a government priority in its  handling of the transport
problem 
5. Road safety and costs  of accidents  are major problems  which
require greater government investment, but this  will  result in a
reduction in other investments
4. Congestion decreases  the quality of the service we offer clients
3. Congestion is  an additional  cost for our company 
2.In the future, the government will  find it increasingly expensive
and therefore difficult to maintain roads  in good condition
1.The condition of Spanish highways  network are good
MEAN MEDIAN 1: Disagree;  2: Neither agree nor disagree;  3: Agree;  4: Strongly agree
 
FIGURE 2. Survey of stakeholders in Spanish roads: Conditions of highway networks  
 
Management of road tolling system  375 
 
The highest support (77% agree or strongly agree) was expressed for the proposal that 
the “roads and highways” agency both collect the revenues and invest those revenues in 
the maintenance of existing, or construction of new, roads. This percentage of 
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agreement decreases to 26% if the institutional framework chosen to collect and use the 380 
revenues is an independent agency and to 12% if the road pricing revenues go to help 
fund the general budget and the government decides on their use. The stakeholders 
disagree with the establishment of a toll agency that will decide how to use the revenues 
collected, even if it is independent of the government (51% disagree). Clearly, they do 
not trust the government to act properly as a manager (that is, a collector and dispenser) 385 
of road revenues. Some stakeholder groups such as the operators of passenger buses, 
private car associations, and highway concessionaires show less opposition to the 
establishment of an independent agency (50% neither agree nor disagree) and the other 
50% agree with the need for a road and highways agency to collect the revenues and 
invest them in the maintenance of existing, or construction of new, roads.   390 
 
 
 
Institutional framework: 
who should manage road pricing revenues?
0 1 2 3 4
3.Road revenues  should be
collected by a highway agency
that invests  in road
maintenance and construction  
2.The revenues  collected from
toll  roads  should be managed
by an independent agency that
wil l  decide how to use them 
1. The road charges  should go
to the government’s  general
treasury. Public administrators
will  decide on its  use 
MEAN MEDIAN1: Disagree;  2: Neither agree nor disagree;  3: Agree;  4: Strongly agree
 
FIGURE 3. Spanish road stakeholders survey: Management of road tolling system 395 
 
Resulting beliefs and adaptation strategies of freight transport operators 
 
The majority of stakeholders, especially the freight operators, consider that the 
implementation of a road pricing system will have some minor effects on the 400 
effectiveness of road transport (fewer empty trips, for example). A minority 42%, 
particularly the passenger bus operators and the associations of private car users think 
that a road pricing system can be useful for the development of better freight and  
passenger rail systems. Furthermore, the great majority, 73%, are skeptical that the 
introduction of a road pricing system could create advantages for air transport (by 405 
means of modal transfer for both freight and passengers). Therefore, the highways 
concessionaires and the associations of private car users are confident that the 
implementation of a road pricing system will have an important effect on the air 
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transport (more than 50% agree or strongly agree with the fact that the road pricing can 
have some effect on the development of  air transport).   410 
 
Road Pricing and alternative transport
0 1 2 3 4
3.Road pricing would help
increase air transport, both of
passengers  and freight
2. Road pricing would help
develop railway transport for
both passengers  and freight 
1. Road pricing will  lead to a
reduction of empty trips  and a
resturctuing of routes  and
services  as  well  as  location of
warehouses, due to increased
costs  
MEAN MEDIAN1: Disagree;  2: Neither agree nor disagree;  3: Agree;  4: Strongly agree
 
FIGURE 4. Spanish road stakeholders survey: Road pricing and alternative transport 
 
Charging technology and acceptability (two open questions) 415 
 
The open-ended responses about the means by which revenues are collected, converge 
on two main solutions. First, 60% indicated that the GPS or TAG and similar tolling 
systems are the best technological solution, due to the compatibility with continuous 
free flow, while reducing the need for vehicles to line up for payment. Second, 40% of 420 
respondents took this occasion to emphasize their belief that road transport is already 
too heavily taxed and that a generalized road pricing system would not be justified 
without a simultaneous reduction in the overall fiscal burden. Clearly, present users of 
the roads, especially freight operators, don’t want to pay to use the highways that are 
currently free.  425 
 
Tolling scheme design  
 
In application of the Directive 2006/38/EC on the charging of HGVs for the use of 
certain infrastructure, including the regulation of future road pricing based on the 430 
external costs (EC Directive 2008/0147), we estimated the social costs of the use of the 
roads and we proposed the following road price scheme to the target population of our 
survey. For cars we chose a range between 0.06 and 0.09 €/vkm and for HGV a range 
between 0.11€/vkm and 0.13€/vkm. The range variability is related to the type of 
vehicle, road characteristics, and traffic conditions. Despite the results of the survey of 435 
German freight operators, who rejected the suggestion of an additional toll to pay for 
congestion (8), the Spanish freight operators (75%) seem to support a real-time 
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congestion price and with a charge related to road quality more than the other groups of 
stakeholders (62%). The highways concessionaires are less in favor of a toll related to 
road quality (50% disagree). In general, all stakeholder groups rejected the suggestion 440 
of a pricing system for the urban roads (55% disagree).  66% of the respondents agreed 
that all road users should have to pay the toll and 64%, knowing that freight operators 
represent 43% of the sample, disagreed with a road charge applied only to HGV. A 
majority (59 %) agreed that road prices should be harmonized throughout the E.U. 
 445 
Presentation of road tolling scheme design
0 1 2 3 4
6. Calculation of road charges  should be the same throughout the
EU
5. Passenger cars  should also have to pay for road use 
4. Road charges  should apply only to heavy vehicles: trucks  and
buses  weighing more than 3.5 T
3. Road charges  should apply to the entire network of roads,
including roads  in the city
2.The road charge should vary depending on the quality of the road 
1. For the same section of road, charges  can vary in accordance
with peak and off‐peak hours  (with rush hour more expensive)
MEAN MEDIAN 1: Disagree;  2: Neither agree nor disagree;  3: Agree;  4: Strongly agree
 
FIGURE 5. Spanish road stakeholders survey: Tolling Schemes Design 
 
 
 450 
Stated preferences experiment 
The literature (39) identified six key questions that need to be addressed prior to 
designing a charging scheme. These are: who should be charged; where should they be 
charged; when should they be charged; how should they be charged; for what should 
they be charged, and how much should be charged. The previous part of the 455 
questionnaire yields answers the first four key questions, while the Stated Preferences 
experiment tries to identify the answers to the two last questions. Stated Preferences is a 
methodology allowing the display quantitatively of relationships explaining variations 
in the acceptability of road tolling in the absence of opportunities to express actual 
voting preferences (8).  460 
 
Two types of analysis were performed with the data collected using stated preferences. 
First, there is a simple descriptive analysis of stated preferences about each combination 
of toll levels and the possible uses of revenues so obtained. This simplified data analysis 
is effective for highlighting gross differences and similarities between different 465 
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stakeholders groups, but it has two important problems: the simple descriptive analysis 
does not tell us what factors significantly influence the stakeholders’ intentional 
behavior and in what way; this kind of analysis does not help to understand how to predict 
and modify the willingness of stakeholders to accept a road pricing scheme.  
 470 
In light of these problems, it was decided to develop a second instrument, a 
discrete-choice model with binary choice (“accept” or “not accept” to pay for using 
highways). It is important to evaluate the sensitivity of the stakeholders to variations in 
the price. This analysis enabled us to distinguish among those respondents who had 
chosen among different revenue-spending combinations. In this kind of model, the main 475 
assumption is that each decision-maker seeks to maximize his personal utility and 
chooses the alternative with the highest utility only for himself.  
 
 As shown in Table1, a total of three levels of toll and uses of the revenues were 
presented in the SP experiment. 480 
 
Table 1.Variables of road pricing scheme 
 
Variable Attributes 
Toll (€/km) 0.05, 0.10, 0 €/km 
Use of the revenues Road Maintenance and one of the following: 
1. New road construction 
2. Road safety   
3. Climate change measures 
 
Table 2 details the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents and 485 
highlights the fact that the biggest companies (more than 5,000,000€ of financial 
turnover annually) are the ones mainly represented. The freight transport operators 
constitute that group of road stakeholder groups most heavily represented.  
 
Table2. Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. 490 
 
Characteristic Level Frequency  Percentage 
Annual turnover Less than € 1 million 
€1-5 million 
More than € 5 million 
Not applicable 
  6 
20 
80 
  8 
5% 
18% 
70% 
7% 
Company type Freight transport 
operators 
Passenger transport 
operators 
Highway concessionaires 
Private car users 
associations 
Experts from institutional 
and administrative field 
 
48 
 
15 
 
23 
 
17 
 
9 
 
42% 
 
13% 
 
20% 
 
14% 
 
11% 
Companies of Combined-
road and rail- transport 
Yes 
 
No 
26 
 
51 
22% 
 
44% 
Logistical services 
offered 
Yes 
No 
39 
35 
34% 
30% 
Number of vehicles by 
transport company 
Less than 6 vehicles 
6-20 vehicles 
21-40 vehicles 
More than 40 vehicles 
5 
8 
7 
38 
 
4% 
7% 
6% 
33% 
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In this context, the discrete-choice model analysis is applied to analyze the 
behavior of the road stakeholders: private car users associations, freight operators, 
passenger bus operators, and highway concessionaires. The following figures and tables 495 
highlight a deep difference between the general preferences scores and the preferences 
scores of each stakeholder. An adjusted majority of all stakeholders seems to be in favor 
of a road pricing scheme (more than 52%). But they are very sensitive to the toll levels. 
37% were in favor of €0.05/vkm versus 15% in favor of €0.10/vkm toll level. However, 
analyzing the results of individual stakeholders, strong differences among the various 500 
kinds of stakeholders appears, as shown in Figure 6 and Table 3. 
 
FIGURE6. Willingness to pay stakeholder by stakeholder at different toll levels and 
different uses of revenue  
 505 
 
 
 
 
 510 
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Table3. Stated preference exercise: Discrete-Choice Model (Binary Logit) Results 515 
 
The associations of private car users appear to be that group of stakeholders 
most willing to accept the implementation of a road-pricing scheme (up to 70% of 
respondents agreed) as well as  a higher level for the toll price (up to 43%, provided that  
the revenue collected is used for road safety and climate change measures) (Figure 6). 520 
This result is confirmed by the implementation of a discrete-choice model with binary 
choice where the associations of private car users chose a high level of toll charge 
Stakeholders  Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Mean of 
X 
PRIVATE CAR USE 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Toll 
-3.76568694 
(-4.382) 
.85930524 1.50000000 
Climate change 
sensitiviness 
1.17805096 
(2.139) 
.55071328 .50980392 
Improvement of road 
safety 
.90853969 
(1.665) 
.54583335 .50000000 
Low annual turnover 
(<1,000,000 €) 
- - - 
Intermediate annual 
turnover (1,000,000-
5,000,000 €) 
2.99871615 
(3.116) 
.96250569 .17647059 
High annual turnover 
(>5,000,000 €) 
3.65008843 
(4.268) 
.85524238 .82352941 
FREIGHT OPE 
RATORS 
Toll 
-1.50331317 
(-10.291) 
.14607699 1.50000000 
Low annual turnover 
(<1,000,000 €) 
3.04507919 
(4,01) 
.69187377 .04081633 
Intermediate annual 
turnover (1,000,000-
5,000,000 €) 
- - - 
High annual turnover 
(>5,000,000 €) 
- - - 
PASSENGER BUS 
OPERATORS 
Toll 
-3.18151156 
(-5.088) 
.62528662 1.50000000 
Low annual turnover 
(<1,000,000 €) 
6.50266053 
(4.629) 
1.40475562 .13333333 
Intermediate annual 
turnover (1,000,000-
5,000,000 €) 
- - - 
High annual turnover 
(>5,000,000 €) 
4.18447161 
(4.752) 
.88048591 .80000000 
HIGHWAY 
CONCESSIONAIRES 
Toll 
-4.22697272 
(-4.980) 
.84878768 1.50000000 
Low annual turnover 
(<1,000,000 €) 
6.34045907 
(4.020) 
1.57717463 .08333333 
Intermediate annual 
turnover (1,000,000-
5,000,000 €) 
6.34045907 
(3.462) 
1.83138430 .04166667 
High annual turnover 
(>5,000,000 €) 
8.31943808 
(4.997) 
1.66483479 .83333333 
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associated with the climate-change measures option for the use of the revenues 
obtained. This result is supported by the result for the road safety option for use of 
resulting revenues. But as for the other road stakeholders, the annual turnover and the 525 
toll level are the most important explanatory variables (Table 3).      
 
The freight operators do not, by a wide margin, accept the introduction of a road 
pricing scheme. Depending on the options about revenue spending, the percentage of 
those who do not agree with road pricing varies between 83%, when revenues will go 530 
for road construction, and 67% when revenues from road charges would go for climate 
change measures. We can argue that a variable that mainly explains the willingness to 
modify opposition to road charges comes mainly from the support for doing something 
about “climate change.” But a first important result of the application of the binary logit 
model is that even if for freight operators the willingness to accept (or less willingness 535 
to oppose) increases when the option for the use of the revenue has to do with “climate 
change” (67% versus 83%), this variable does not explain the varying rates for the 
freight operators’ response as to the acceptability of road tolls. The only significant 
variables that help explain rates of acceptance seem to be the annual turnover and the 
size of the road-use charge level. Smaller operators, characterized by a lower annual 540 
turnover, seem to be less hostile to accept the introduction of a road pricing scheme 
(Figure 6 and Table 3).  
 
In the case of the operators of passenger transport the willingness to accept 
seems to increase if the revenue generated by tolls is used for safety road measures 545 
(72%) (figure 6). But analyzing the data by the binary logit model, concern for road 
safety appears to diminish as an explanation for the greater acceptance of a road charge 
by the operators of passenger transport. In fact, the target population that is readiest to 
pay for road safety also accepts the use of revenues to pay for other possibilities, such 
as, for example, new road construction. Once more, the size of a respondent bus 550 
company’s annual turnover seems to be a useful explanatory variable for the 
respondents who operate passenger busses. Like the freight operators, they are still 
sensible to the toll level (Table3). 
 
The highway concessionaires seem to strongly agree with the introduction of a 555 
road pricing scheme (only 6% chose a toll, level of €0/vkm) (Figure 6). Like the freight 
and passenger operators, the annual turnover is an explanatory variable for the 
acceptance of highway concessionaires. But these operators are price-sensitive, and 
react negatively to rises in the proposed toll levels. Even if the descriptive analysis 
seems to show a strong sensitiveness to the climate change measures, the binary logit 560 
model does not regard this as an explanatory variable. In fact, the highway 
concessionaires never chose climate-change measures alone as the object of revenue 
spending, but always for climate change measures and another option – road 
construction and/or road safety, for the use of revenues derived from road tolls. 
(Table3). 565 
 
Even if this Stated Preference data derived from our survey are not 
representative of the general attitude of the public in Spain, they represent a new 
attempt to gather the opinion of the road stakeholder groups (private car users 
associations, freight operators, passenger bus operators and highway concessionaires) 570 
about tolling scheme. The conclusions can help suggest ways to make more consistent 
the current tolling system.  
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CONCLUSION: PRICING POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This research shows that pricing policy for European road networks has notable 575 
problems as to acceptability by the relevant stakeholders groups. The EU wants to 
create a common European pricing system, based on environmental damage caused by 
roads and their users, which would apply to all trunk road networks in Europe. 
However, it is difficult to modify the present national systems and to create a 
homogeneous European one, because every country has a different perception of the 580 
reasons to implement it, and the urgency of the need. Northern and Central European 
countries are more willing to pay for environmental and equity reasons (13), while 
southern ones perceive pricing more as a new tax instrument. 
 
Groups of road stakeholders in Spain have experience with toll roads dating 585 
back to the 1960s. The results of the survey show that they think that environmental and 
safety problems are relevant (46% and 51%, respectively) to road use and road 
revenues, but they are not eager to pay for alleviation of such problems. In other words, 
social responsibility is not an important factor in the acceptance of a road pricing 
scheme by a Spanish stakeholder (35). At the same time, these stakeholders groups in 590 
Spain do not believe that pricing could have an impact on demand for road use: 
reducing the number of trips, transferring road trips to rail or air, or changing current 
logistics practice.  
 
They perceive that the highway network in Spain is currently of good quality, 595 
but they also perceive increasing congestion as a real problem. Many different kinds of 
stakeholders think that government should not be in charge of spending the revenues 
collected from tolls; they prefer an independent agency. They think that the European 
pricing scheme should be homogeneous through the E.U. road network and be applied 
to all kinds of cars and trucks. However, respondents prefer to keep urban roads free of 600 
charge. 
 
Finally, different groups of stakeholders supply different answers. Private car 
users associations agree on paying tolls to improve road safety and reducing GHG 
emissions, as emerged from the logit model fashioned from the data in the Stated 605 
Preferences survey (table 3). Bus operators are willing to pay only for reducing 
accidents, while freight operators are unwilling to pay whatever the reason. None of 
them would pay to cover infrastructure costs. Highway concessionaires are the only 
group that clearly supports the charging system, but they prefer moderate to high level 
of fees. The logit models based on the SP survey indicate that the level of charge is 610 
relevant for the acceptability of pricing schemes in the four groups of stakeholders. The 
income level of the company also influences the views on acceptability but not 
homogeneously. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that pricing policy still is far from being accepted 615 
by the different groups of road stakeholders. The general perception is that of 
considering tolls as a way to collect taxes, rather than as a way to improve the system 
for construction, and maintenance, and hence for the use, of road networks (40).  
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